Gerecht bevestigt afwijzing nietigheidsvordering tegen gezamenlijk ingeschreven EU-merk wegens aantoonbare toestemming

Gerecht EU 22 april 2026, IEF 23497; IEFbe 4199; ECLI:EU:T:2026:277 (Peponis tegen EUIPO en Palamianakis). In zaak T-494/24 heeft het Gerecht het beroep verworpen tegen de beslissing van de Tweede Kamer van Beroep van het EUIPO over het figuratieve Uniemerk CRETE HOMES REAL ESTATE CRETE PROPERTY and CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANTS SINCE 1990, dat sinds 2008 op naam stond van zowel Emmanouil Peponis als Fanourios Palamianakis. Peponis had in 2021 nietigverklaring gevorderd en verzocht het merk aan hem over te dragen, stellende dat Palamianakis als agent of vertegenwoordiger het merk mede op zijn eigen naam had laten registreren zonder de vereiste toestemming van de merkhouder. Het Gerecht verduidelijkt eerst dat wegens de indieningsdatum van de merkaanvraag, 6 oktober 2007, de materiële beoordeling plaatsvindt op grond van art. 52 lid 1, onder b, juncto art. 8 lid 3 van Verordening nr. 40/94, ook al was de nietigheidsvordering formeel gebaseerd op art. 60 lid 1, onder b, juncto art. 8 lid 3 UMVo 2017/1001; procedureel geldt wel de huidige UMVo. Het Gerecht herhaalt dat art. 8 lid 3 vier cumulatieve voorwaarden kent en dat de zaak hier reeds strandt op de voorwaarde dat de inschrijving door de agent of vertegenwoordiger zonder toestemming van de merkhouder moet zijn verricht. Die toestemming moet duidelijk, specifiek en onvoorwaardelijk zijn. Volgens het Gerecht heeft de Kamer van Beroep terecht geoordeeld dat van zulke toestemming sprake was, in het bijzonder op basis van een door beide partijen ondertekende algemene volmacht, die kort na de merkaanvraag bij EUIPO was ingediend, betrekking had op de lopende registratieprocedure en beide ondertekenaars als aanvragers aanwees. Daaruit mocht worden afgeleid dat de aanvraag bewust in beider naam was gedaan en dat beider mede-eigendom was beoogd.

Het Gerecht acht die conclusie bovendien bevestigd door de feitelijke context. Uit de chronologie blijkt dat de zakelijke relatie tussen partijen zich geleidelijk had verdiept: Palamianakis was eerst werknemer, werd vervolgens gemachtigde met bevoegdheid om de handelsnaam CRETE HOMES te gebruiken, en werd later zakenpartner in een in 2010 opgerichte vennootschap onder firma. Tegen die achtergrond is de gezamenlijke merkinschrijving volgens het Gerecht niet vreemd, maar juist consistent met de ontwikkeling van hun samenwerking. Dat eerdere merken, domeinnamen en andere rechten alleen op naam van Peponis stonden, maakt dat niet anders; hetzelfde geldt voor het feit dat het oudere Griekse merk uitsluitend op zijn naam stond. Ook het betoog dat Palamianakis de mede-inschrijving voor hem verborgen zou hebben gehouden, faalde bij gebrek aan bewijs, evenals de stelling dat het herkomstaanduidingsbeginsel van het merkenrecht zich tegen gezamenlijke registratie zou verzetten. Verder verwerpt het Gerecht het procedurele argument dat EUIPO nog een afzonderlijke expliciete bevestiging van Peponis had moeten verlangen: bij een tijdig ingediende, door beide partijen ondertekende volmacht bestond daartoe geen verplichting. Ook de klachten over motivering, zorgvuldigheid, rechtszekerheid en behoorlijk bestuur slagen niet. Het beroep is daarom in zijn geheel afgewezen. Omdat in deze zaak wel een zitting heeft plaatsgevonden, is Peponis veroordeeld tot betaling van zijn eigen kosten én die van EUIPO en Palamianakis; voor de kosten van de procedure bij de Kamer van Beroep blijft het dictum van die beslissing gelden.

36      It is apparent from the case-law that consent for the purposes of the registration of the mark in the name of the representative or agent must be clear, specific and unconditional (judgment of 29 November 2012, Adamowski v OHIM – Fagumit (FAGUMIT), T‑537/10 and T‑538/10, EU:T:2012:634, paragraph 23).

37      It is apparent from paragraph 45 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found that the general power of attorney issued by both parties was intended to enable the joint representative to represent both parties before EUIPO in all procedures as an applicant or beneficiary, in relation to any application, present or future, or any EU trade mark registration, and also in any other procedure before EUIPO.

38      In the first place, in respect of the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal inferred consent on his part on the sole basis of the general power of attorney, it should be noted that that argument is founded on a misreading of the contested decision. In fact, the contested decision also took into consideration facts and acts prior and subsequent to the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue, as is apparent from paragraph 22 above. In that regard, it should be noted that, in addition to prior facts and acts, it has been held that EUIPO can take into consideration evidence which, although subsequent to the date of filing of the application for registration, enables the drawing of conclusions regarding the situation as it was on that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 2008, L & D v OHIM, C‑488/06 P, EU:C:2008:420, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

39      In the second place, in respect of the argument that the general power of attorney does not constitute clear, specific and unconditional consent to the registration of the mark at issue in the intervener’s name, the applicant submits that the general power of attorney gives rise to doubts as to how and when it was signed. Moreover, that general power of attorney does not reflect a clear intention on the part of the applicant, in particular because of the vague reference made therein to ‘all’ procedures.

40      In that regard, it should be noted that the general power of attorney in question was signed by both parties, which has not been disputed.

41      Moreover, it should be emphasised that the general power of attorney was granted by both parties in favour of a joint representative specifically to file the application for registration of the mark at issue. That general power of attorney was filed with EUIPO by the joint representative on 2 November 2007, less than one month after the application for registration of the mark at issue was filed. That document clearly names both signatories as applicants for registration of the mark at issue, which implies that they will subsequently become co-proprietors of that mark. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant is the sole proprietor of the Greek mark referred to in paragraph 4 above cannot, in itself, call into question his consent to the registration of the mark at issue in the intervener’s name, as co-proprietor.

42      In the third place, the applicant’s argument that the general power of attorney is vague, in referring to ‘all’ procedures without distinction, should be rejected on the ground that that power of attorney specifies, as indicated in paragraph 37 above, that it is intended to apply, in essence, to any procedure, present or future. Moreover, that document was filed in the context of the registration procedure specific to the mark at issue, and no other procedure was ongoing. In that regard, the applicant was not able to provide any evidence allowing the conclusion that the mention of a ‘present’ application referred to anything other than the registration procedure concerning the mark at issue. Those factors enabled the Board of Appeal to hold, rightly, that the general power of attorney did indeed relate to the application for registration of the mark at issue.

43      In the fourth place, although the applicant relies on the judgment of 28 June 2023, Shape of a blade of grass in a bottle (T‑145/22, EU:T:2023:365), it should be noted, as he himself acknowledges, that that case concerned the condition in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 40/94 linked to the existence of a relationship of agency or representation between the parties and not the condition linked to the absence of the trade mark proprietor’s consent. Therefore, that argument is irrelevant and must, for that reason, be rejected.

44      In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the general power of attorney, in particular, showed clear, specific and unconditional consent on the part of the applicant.

48      It is clear from the contested decision that, in order to support its conclusion in relation to the applicant’s consent, the Board of Appeal analysed other evidence in the file which it considered to be of relevance and which concerned acts prior and subsequent to the application for registration of the mark at issue, as is apparent, in essence, from paragraph 22 above.

49      The applicant submits, first, that the Board of Appeal has not taken sufficient account of the acts prior to the application for registration of the mark at issue, namely, in particular, (i) the special proxy authenticated by notarial deed of 6 March 2007, by which the applicant designated the intervener as representative and proxy, and conferred upon him the right and the power to use the trade name ‘CRETE HOMES’, and (ii) the application for registration of the Greek mark referred to in paragraph 4 above, in the sole name of the applicant, on 11 May 2007. In the applicant’s view, those acts and the registration in his sole name of domain names demonstrate that he had no intention of consenting to the registration of the mark at issue also in the intervener’s name. Had there been consent on his part, the name of the intervener would have appeared in those various documents, due to their closeness in time to the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue. Secondly, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal attributed too great an importance to the parties’ setting up of a general partnership, three years after the application for registration, in order to show that the applicant had consented to the registration of the mark at issue also in the intervener’s name.

50      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 38 above, EUIPO can take into consideration evidence which, although subsequent to the date of filing of the application for registration, enables the drawing of conclusions regarding the situation as it was before that date.

51      For that purpose, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal rightly took account, in particular in paragraphs 50 to 52 thereof, of the chronological sequence of events in order to assess whether the applicant consented to the registration of the mark at issue in the names of both parties.

52      That chronological sequence of events, as detailed in paragraph 33 above, tends to show that the business relationship between the parties, which started in 2000, became closer with the passing of time. Thus, the intervener, who initially was the applicant’s employee, subsequently became his representative and proxy and then his business partner.

53      Moreover, the abovementioned chronological sequence shows that the applicant had been able to carry out, in his sole name, various registration procedures. It is only after co-signing a general power of attorney with the intervener that the application for registration of the mark at issue was filed in both names.

54      Thus, the abovementioned factors do not allow the conclusion that the applicant had not consented to the registration of the mark at issue in his name and that of the intervener. Moreover, that chronological sequence highlights the growing development of the business relationship between the parties. Therefore, the fact that from 2 July 2008 the parties officially became co-proprietors of the mark at issue is consistent with the development of their business relationship. All those factors, taken as a whole, constitute a body of evidence which makes it possible to conclude that there was clear, specific and unconditional consent on the part of the applicant.

55      Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not err in concluding that the business relationship between the parties and, in particular, the setting up of a partnership in 2010 support the conclusion that the applicant for a declaration of invalidity had given his consent to the filing of the application for the registration of the mark at issue in the names of both parties.

76      In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that in the present case the applicant’s consent could be established in a clear, specific and unconditional manner.